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I. Introduction 
 A central theme of the agency-theoretic view of corporate finance is that corporate 
insiders may not maximize shareholder value but instead pursue their self-interest.  Recent 
research in corporate governance has focused on how the mechanisms to uncover insiders’ 
diversion of corporate resources can constraint this agency behavior.  Among others, Shleifer 
and Wolfenzon (2002) point out that increasing the probability of detection and the punishment 
for diversion of corporate resources results in higher firm value and lower cost of capital.  In this 
paper we extend this framework to examine how the quality of investor protection, defined as 
ability to limit managerial diversion of cash flows, affects managerial investment choices. 
In our model, the manager makes two choices: the amount of perks to consume and the 
choice of risk in the investment decision.  There is incomplete contracting on these choices such 
that both decisions are made to maximize the manager’s utility.  The model is laid out in two 
stages: the investment choice is made at the first stage and the perk choice is made at the second 
stage.  The optimal choice of perks is a function of the degree of investor protection and of 
managerial ownership (although the latter is assumed to be below one hundred percent due to a 
managerial wealth constraint).  Interestingly, the perks that the manager anticipates consuming in 
the second stage have the potential to distort her choice of investment risk in the first stage.  
Since the managerial perks are “skimmed off the top,” they are tantamount to the manager 
holding a priority claim on the company’s cash flow.  This has an incentive effect on the 
manager’s investment risk choice as if she held the firm’s debt of a value equal to the amount of 
the optimal perks, the well-known effect of concavifying the manager’s objective function.  
Ultimately, anticipated perk consumption makes the manager more conservative in her 
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investment risk choice than otherwise, and causes her to forgo risky projects that would be value 
enhancing to shareholders. 
An improvement in investor protection, however, increases the expected cost of perk 
consumption and results in a lower optimal level of perks.  This is equivalent to reducing the 
amount of “senior debt” that the manager holds and in turn ameliorates her sub-optimal 
conservatism.  In other words, better technology in “catching” and “punishing” managerial 
diversion of resources reduces managers’ inclination to forego risky but value enhancing 
projects. 
The above result has important implications.  First, it suggests a novel avenue by which 
better corporate governance enhances firm value.  The relation between corporate governance 
and risk-taking has been hitherto largely unexplored.1  Second, to the extent that risky projects 
are associated with efforts to innovate and innovations are associated with growth, particularly 
productivity growth, our result suggests a new path by means of which better protection for 
investors’ property rights may increase growth. 
We use cross-country data from 1992 to 2002 for thirty-eight countries to test the 
propositions that better investor protection leads to higher risk-taking and in turn higher growth.  
To proxy for the “riskiness” of chosen investment projects we use the variation in firm level cash 
flow over total assets.  We find that the measure is positively associated with proxies for 
shareholder rights suggested in La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and with economic growth, including 
total factor productivity growth.  These results are robust to including various controls suggested 
in the literature.   
                                                 
1 Philippon (2002) suggests that corporate governance can help explain the increase in the firm-specific volatility in 
the US – yet though he links this to competition – competitive product markets contribute to volatile firm markups 
but to smoother path of the overall profitability. Similarly, Allen and Gale (2000) address the issue of corporate 
governance and competition.  
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Since management might be able to manipulate cashflow (Ball, Kothari, Robin (2000) 
and Leuz, Nanda, Wysocki (2003)), one concern is that low cashflow volatility may indicate 
active income smoothing rather than genuinely low real volatility.  That is, to the extent that 
income smoothing is less prevalent in high investor protection countries, the correlation between 
high cashflow volatility and high investor protection could be affected by a relationship between 
investor protection and income manipulation.  We therefore also consider an imputed measure of 
risk-taking.  We first select the country with the least earnings smoothing, which, according to 
Leuz et al. (2003) and Bhattacharya, Daouk, Welker (2002) is the United States.  We then use 
that country’s scaled corporate cashflow, based only on undiversified firms, to compute a 
benchmark volatility index for each 3-digit SIC industry.  For each country, the weighted 
average of these industry-level volatility indices, weighted by the country’s industry 
composition, captures the “risks” which the country’s firms collectively undertake.  Using the 
so-computed risk-taking measure we perform the same analysis as before and find stronger 
results.  
Our line of argument – better investor protection leads to more value-enhancing 
managerial risk-taking and thus faster growth – is a part of a growing literature on the 
relationship between corporate governance, firm value, and growth.  A long series of work, 
ranging from King, Levine (1993a, 1993b), Levine (1997), to Rajan, Zingales (1998) develop the 
positive causal chains that build from financial markets development to capital accumulation and 
to growth.  In addition, Allen and Gale (1997) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) argue that 
economies that provide better risk-diversification tend to promote risk taking in investments and 
thus growth.  Another long series of work, initiated by La Porta et al (1997, 1998) and followed 
up by many, e.g., Demirguç-Kunt, Maksimovic (1998), Beck, Levine (2002), Beck, Demirguç–
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Kunt, and Levine (2003), show that enforced property rights protection for outside shareholders 
contribute to financial market development and then growth.  Yet another line focuses on capital 
markets as a device to allocate resources and thus contribute to growth, e.g., Wurgler (2000) and 
Fisman and Love (2003)).  Morck, Yeung, Yu (2000), Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004), and 
Durnev, et al. (2004) emphasize that capital markets can carry out this resource allocation role 
better when investors are more informed and informativeness stems from secured investor’s 
property rights.  At a micro level of analysis, researchers have noticed the relationship between 
managerial incentive and risk-taking.  For example, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) and 
Holmstrom and Ricarti Costa (1986) have argued that managers exhibit excessive managerial 
conservatism stemming from managerial career concerns.     
The organization of the paper is as follows.  Section II introduces our model that links 
managerial risk-taking behavior to investor protection and derives testable implications.  Section 
III covers data and methodology.  Section IV presents the empirical results and Section V 
concludes.   
   
II. A Basic Model  
A. Set up 
This section presents a simple model that captures the essential aspects at play.  As in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) we assume that the manager’s objective function has two components: perk 
consumption P and wealth W.  Her objective is thus ( )WPU , .  To simplify the exposition we 
will use a utility function that is additive in the utility of perk consumption and the utility of 
wealth.  Further we will assume that the manager’s utility of perks is concave in the level of 
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perks consumed and the utility of wealth is linear. Combining these features the managerial 
objective function has the form ( ) ( )PGWWPU +=, , where ( ).G  is a concave function. 
 In most of the analysis we will work with a particular structure of managerial preferences 
for perk consumption, ( ) PgPG = .  Here g  is an index of the manager’s propensity to 
consume perks.  “ g ” will be specified such that the optimal level of perks chosen by the 
manager is large enough to have an effect on the incentives of the manager; the details of this 
scaling will be discussed later. 
 Now we introduce the menu of investments available to the manager and the nature of 
incomplete contracting that is at the heart of the agency problems.  The manager chooses 
between two available projects each requiring an identical investment outlay I : (i) a risk free 
project (or a storage technology) that generates I  dollars with certainty (for simplicity but 
without loss of generality we normalize the risk-free return to be zero); and (ii) a risky project 
that generates either a high cash flow H  with a probability q , or a low cash flow L  with a 
probability ( )q−1 , where H > I > L. 2   
 We assume that q  is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 and this distribution is 
common knowledge at t = 0.  The value of q becomes known only to the manager at t = 1 before 
she chooses between the risky and the risk-free project.  It is assumed that q  is not verifiable and 
hence not contractible.  The timeline of events is as follows: 
1. At time t = 0, the manager is given an optimal compensation structure that involves α  of 
equity (equity participation).  We could allow the manager to draw in addition a salary 
from the company, but in the basic model and without loss of generality, we set the salary 
                                                 
2 We have also looked into a more general menu of projects available to the manager.  However, to emphasize the 
results of our theoretical work, and without loss of generality, we simplify the modeling by assuming the presence of 
a risk free project as in John and John (1993). 
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equal to zero.3  The firm also sells outside claims of value exceeding the investment 
amount I required.  These claims are rationally priced at t = 0 anticipating the investment 
policy to be implemented by the manager at t = 1 and the perks she will consume at t = 2.  
For simplicity, we will consider external equity as the only outside claim.  This is without 
loss of generality since the split between debt and equity has no additional incentive 
effects in our model. 
2. The manager learns q  and chooses between the risky and the risk-free project. 
3. At t = 2, the cashflow from the project is realized.  From the realized cashflow Y , the 
manager appropriates an amount P , YP ≤ , as a perk.  The residual cashflow is reported 
as earnings available for distribution to external claimholders (equity holders). 
 The manager’s problem is thus a two-stage optimization.  In the first stage the manager 
chooses between the risky investment project and the risk-free investment project conditional on 
the value of q  (the probability of success of the risky project) that she observes.  In the second 
stage the cashflow from investment is realized, that is LY =  or H  if the risky project is chosen 
or IY =  if the risk free project is chosen.  In the second stage optimization, for any realized 
value of Y  the manager chooses the optimal perk consumption P , YP ≤ .   
 We shall solve the problem by backward induction: determine the manager’s optimal 
perk choice in the second stage, fold it backwards, and then determine the investment choice at 
the first stage.  The level of perks optimally consumed by the manager is endogenously 
determined as a function of her preference for perks and the effectiveness of the legal system.  
There are several ways that researchers have modeled the effect of the legal system on the 
manager’s utility for perk consumption; we follow a simple implementation.  We use a 
                                                 
3 The managerial salary S is deducted from the operating cashflows along with other relevant costs to arrive at 
realized cashflows from the project.  With this interpretation a non-zero level of managerial salary would not alter 
any results that follow. 
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parameter φ  to denote the effectiveness of the legal system in disciplining managers and 
protecting the rights of outside investors.  Specifically, φ  is the probability that the manager’s 
perk consumption is detected (P is revealed) and the manager is punished.  The legal system 
imposes costs on the manager such that she derives zero utility from consuming perks.  Her 
utility then is limited to that from her contracted compensation, ( )+− PY  α .  On the other hand, 
with a probability ( )φ−1 , her perk consumption goes undetected and she derives utility from 
both her perk consumption, P  and the contracted compensation ( )+− PY  α .  Note that in both 
cases the shareholders’ cashflows are reduced by P.  
 In the managerial preference for perks ( ) PgPG = , we need to parameterize the value 
of g , such that the manager’s choice of perks is important enough to affect her investment 
choices and thus engenders agency costs.  There are several ways to parameterize g  such that 
the optimal perk consumption is a non-trivial fraction of the firm’s cashflows in the low state of 
the world (state L ).  We will discuss an appropriate parameterization of g  such that this is the 
case, after we characterize the optimal perk consumption in Lemma 1 to follow. 
 In the basic model of this section we will take α  to be exogenous.  Issues of 
endogenizing α  will be addressed in the appendix.  Since managerial wealth is only a small 
fraction of the firm, and the amount I  needed for investment has to be raised by selling external 
equity, the largest value of α  that can be given to the manager will be limited to be a small 
fraction of the firm, assuming that personal wealth constraint is binding.  The details of this 
argument will be spelled out in the next section.  
 
B. Solution 
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 Given the above setup, the objective of the manager for the second stage problem is  
 
( ) ( ) PgPYP φα −+− + 1  max            
(1) 
 
We characterize the optimal choice of perk consumption in lemma one. 
 
Lemma 1 
The optimal consumption of perks in the second stage problem is given by 
[ ]0,min PYP = ,              
(2) 
for Y = L, I, or H and ( ) 2220 41 αφ gP −= .  
Proof: Let 0PY > . Let HP , LP , and IP  represent respective perk consumption in the high and 
low state of the risky project and in the risk-free project.  The first order condition with respect to 
HP , LP , and IP  are given by (we omit the subscript for brevity): ( )
P
g
2
10 φα −+−=  which implies 
that the optimal perk consumption is ( ) 2220 41 αφ gP −= .  If 0PY ≤  then the manager 
consumes all cash flow as perks. (Notice that the second derivative of her objective function is 
( ) 0
4
1
3
<−−
P
g φ  which implies that the first derivative is positive at 0PYP <= . Thus the manager is 
eager to consume more perks but she is constrained doing so by the available cashflows.)  Thus 
we obtain equation (2).     Q.E.D. 
Remark: The incentive problems in investment policy that we discuss below are 
important only when the perk consumption by the manager is non-trivial.  In our model we will 
parameterize the value of g , the manager’s propensity to consume perks to be large enough such 
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that the optimal perks that the manager consumes is a same order of magnitude as L, the lowest 
possible cash flow realization under the risky technology of the firm.  From the form of the 
optimal perks characterized in Lemma 1 it should be clear that the optimal perks are an 
increasing function of g  and that for any firm of a given value L, there exist a corresponding 
value of g  such that this condition is satisfied.4   
The expected utility of the manager at the optimal level of perk consumption in the 
second stage problem can be used to derive the solution to the first stage problem.  That is, the 
investment policy undertaken at t = 0 maximizes the expected utility of the manager at that stage 
taking into account the optimal perk consumption derived in the second stage problem.  The 
modeling framework borrows at this stage from John and John (1993).  We start by defining 
important investment policy requirements and the first best investment benchmark.   
 
Definition: The investment policy { }q~  will denote investing in the risky project for all qq ~≥  and 
investing in the risk-free project for qq ~< .   
Lemma 2: The investment policy{ }q  is the first best Pareto optimal investment rule where   
 
LH
LIq −
−=                
(3) 
Proof:  Under complete contracting, the shareholders would want to implement the value-
maximizing investment policy, i.e., accepting the risky project when its expected return exceeds 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, if we had represented ( ) ηPPG = , 10 <<η , again the optimal perk consumption is monotonically 
increasing in η  and hence there exists some value of η , where 10 <<η , such that the optimal perks is the same 
order of magnitude as L.  We can use that value of η  to parameterize the managerial utility for perk consumption. 
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that of the risk free project, ( ) ILqHq ≥−+ 1 .  This is equivalent to implementing the 
investment policy { }q  where q  is given in equation (3).      Q.E.D. 
As in the proof of Lemma 1, let HP , IP , and LP  denote the perk consumption in states Y 
= H, I and L respectively.  Similarly let HW , IW , LW  denote the manager’s contractual 
compensation (wealth) equal to ( )+− HPHα , ( )+− IPIα , and ( )+− LPLα  respectively.  We will 
also denote as ( )HHH WPUU ,= , ( )III WPUU ,= , and ( )LLL WPUU ,=  the utility levels for the 
manager in states H, I, L respectively.5  Now we are ready to characterize the optimal investment 
decision taken by the manager in the first stage problem.   
 
Proposition 1 
The optimal investment policy for the second stage problem is { }q~  where q~  is given by  
            
LH
LI
UU
UUq −
−=~       
(4) 
Proof:  For each level of q  such that ( ) ILH UUqqU ≥−+ 1 , the manager undertakes the risky 
project; otherwise she will undertake the risk-free project.  This is equivalent to implementing 
the investment policy { }q~ , where q~  is given in equation (4).     Q.E.D. 
Remark: To illustrate Proposition 1, consider the following case.  Let 0PL > .  In this case 
notice that q
LH
LIq ≡−
−=~ .  When 0PL >  the investment policy chosen by the perk-consuming 
                                                 
5 The contingent payoffs are as follows. For 0PY > , where Y = L, I, or H, the utility of the manager is 
( ) ( ) ( )2
22
2
22
4
11
4
1),( α
φφα
φα gggYWPU −−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=  which is equal to ( )α
φα
4
1 22 gY −+  equal to ( )0PY +α . If 0PY ≤  utility will be 
( ) YgWPU φ−= 1),( . Using these we characterize the expected payoff of the two projects. 
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manager is the same as the one with complete contracting.  The rationale is as follows.  When the 
optimal perk consumption P0 is sufficiently low ( L< ) such that even in the unlucky low state 
perk consumption is not jeopardized, there is no investment distortion.  However, as we 
summarize in the following proposition, when perk consumption is higher than the minimally 
available cashflow the managerial investment policy is sub-optimal: in these instances perk 
consumption is similar to risky debt held by the manager, and she implements an investment 
policy that is sub-optimally conservative.   
 
Proposition 2  
The investment policy implemented in the second stage is: 
            (a)   qq =~  if 0PL ≥ , 
            (b)   q
ALH
ALIq >+−
+−=~  if LPI >> 0   
 (5) 
            (c)   ( ) ( )( ) ( ) qLggH
LIgq >
−−−+
−−=
φα
φα
φ
1
4
1
1~
22
 if IPH ≥> 0  
 (6) 
where ( ) 0
2
1 2 ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= α
φ gLA   
 (7) 
Thus, the manager will invest in the risky project less often than what is optimal under the 
Pareto investment policy, qq >~ , if LP >0 .  
 13
Proof: See Appendix.6 
 The implication is that the manager who appropriates company cashflow for personal 
benefits will forgo risky projects within )~,[ qqq∈ , qq >~ , when LP >0 .  The intuition is as 
follows.  In the low payoff state of a risky project, the insider’s perk consumption will be limited 
to L.  Therefore, she would adopt a risky project only when the high payoff state is considerable 
and likely enough to compensate for the lost “perks” in the low payoff state: there exists a sub-
set of risky projects whose high payoff state is not sufficiently high and likely enough so that the 
manager will optimally relinquish these.  Yet, these projects would have been accepted in a 
world of complete contracting.7  
 We now evaluate the impact of an improvement in φ , the effectiveness of the legal 
system in disciplining managers on the riskiness of the investment policy implemented and its 
effect on the value of the firm.   
 
Proposition 3  
For LP >0 , an increase in φ  (the effectiveness of the legal regime) will make the manager 
undertake the risky projects more frequently, 0
~
<∂
∂
φ
q .  This higher risk-taking is in the direction 
                                                 
6 We omit the case HP ≥0  since the problem we study is not well defined when the optimal perk consumption 
exceeds the maximum project cashflow.  It is straightforward to show that in this case the optimal investment policy 
is 
q
LH
LIq ≥−
−=~ , and thus this case conforms to Proposition 2. 
7 Some may argue that the constraint on perk consumption in the low payoff state of a risky investment is not 
applicable to a large, cash-rich company.  However, we believe that our intuition – low payoffs in low return states 
constrain perk consumption and thus managers avoid risky investment projects whose high payoffs in high return 
states do not adequately compensate for the perk reduction – is general.  We could easily present a model in which 
investment payoffs are always adequate to cover perk consumption and yet revelation of perk consumption is more 
likely in low pay off states.  Such a model will generate qualitatively similar results as the current model.   
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of the first-best investment risk level and so is accompanied by higher expected growth rates, 
( ) 0~
~
<∂
∂
q
qV . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Remark: With an increase in φ , the probability of being caught diverting cash flow, the 
manager implements a riskier investment policy { }q~ , i.e. she uses a lower cut-off level q~  for 
risky investments. Since qq >~ , a lower cut-off level results in higher firm value.  There are two 
implications.  The first is that an improvement in detecting management’s cashflow diversion 
raises the riskiness of the distribution of adopted projects.  The second is that this increase in the 
riskiness of the distribution is desirable: it will be accompanied by an increase in the expected 
net present value.  To see that, we have to first calculate the present value of investment project’s 
from the investors’ point of view.  Investors do not know the value of q , but only that q  is 
uniformly distributed on [ ]1,0 .  Based on this, the net present value expected by investors is:8 
 ( ) ( ) ( )22 ~1
2
~1
2
~~ qHqLIqIqV −+−++−=           
(8) 
Differentiating V( q~ ) with respect to q~ , for the perk-consuming insider yields:  
 ( ) ( ) 0~~
~
<−−−=∂
∂ qLHLI
q
qV            
(9)  
The latter has a negative sign because qq >~  (see Proposition 2).  The intuition is as follows.  A 
perk-consuming manager will tend to be overly conservative in order to preserve her perk 
                                                 
8 More precisely, the net present value expected by equity holders is 
( ) ( ) ∫∫∫ +−++−= 1
~
1
~
~
0
1~
qq
q
qdqHdqqLdqIIqV . 
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consumption, much like a debt-holder would want a company to take less risk to preserve the 
value of her contingency claims.  Notice that, however, the manager may forgo risky projects 
that increase expected firm value.  When better investor protection reduces the level of optimal 
perk consumption, the manager implements higher-valued and higher-risk investment policy. 
 Our results are derived assuming that the manager’s incentives (α) are exogenous.  In 
equilibrium, incentives will be set to offset manager’s excess risk aversion.  In the appendix, we 
show that allowing an endogenously determined incentive α does not change our results as long 
as the manager faces a personal wealth constraint. 
In summary, our contribution here lies in providing a novel mechanism for explaining 
why corporate governance matters for growth.  Specifically, Proposition 3 leads to several 
empirical hypotheses:  
1. Better investors protection, especially better disclosure rules and more effective 
monitoring of manager’s behavior, will result in greater managerial risk taking;  
2. Higher risk-taking leads to higher firm growth; and, 
3. Because the risk-taking is value-enhancing, the volatility of investment returns in high-
disclosure and effective-monitoring countries are associated with greater country level 
growth in GDP and productivity.    
 
III. Empirical Implications and Tests  
 We test these main empirical predictions using Compustat Global Vantage data for thirty-
eight countries in the period 1992-2002.  A cross-country study is appropriate because variation 
in corporate accountability across countries is more likely to be exogenous than variations within 
countries.  The empirical work entails regressing firm level and country-level observations of 
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“risk-taking” in corporate operations on variables that capture corporate accountability, 
controlling for other relevant factors.  We also regress firm- and country-level growth measure 
(including country-level total factor productivity growth) on “risk-taking” in corporate 
operations, controlling for corporate accountability and other factors to test the mechanism that 
Proposition 3 implies.  The regression specifications are as follows: 
            cccc LITYACCOUNTABIRISK ωααα +++= X321  
 (10) 
            cccc RISKRGDP ϑβββ +++= Y321    
 (11) 
            cccc RISKTFP ςγγγ +++= Z321   
 (12) 
where the subscripts c indicates country, RISK is a proxy for risk-taking in corporate operations, 
ACCOUNTABILITY is a proxy for corporate accountability, RGDP is the per-capita real GDP 
growth, TFP is the total factor productivity growth, and Xc, Yc, and Zc are matrices of control 
variables.  Our first empirical hypothesis implies that 2α  is positive while the third empirical 
hypothesis implies β2 and γ2 are positive.  Our second empirical hypothesis implies that a firm 
level data regression analogous to (11) but replacing country level growth by firm level growth 
also generates a positive β2.    Note that in regressions (11) and (12), we will include as controls 
the “corporate accountability” variables.  If indeed these controls explain the variation in the 
risk-taking measure, then we would expect that including them in the regression will lower the 
explanatory power of that measure.  Nevertheless, by including them as controls we can identify 
whether risk taking per se affects growth.  
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A. Description of Variables  
Below is an extended description of how we construct our key variables.  See Table 1 for a 
concise reference. 
A.1. Measuring risk taking 
Ideally, to measure the true choice of the underlying economic risk, we would like to have 
something like the probability of success, q, in the model.  Of course, this is unobservable.  
However, since riskier corporate operations have more volatile returns to capital, we develop 
three proxies for the degree of risk-taking in firm’s operations: (i) the industry-adjusted volatility 
of firm-level profitability over the sample period 1992-2002; (ii) a country average of the 
volatility of firm profitability; and (iii) an imputed country risk score, based on industry risk 
characteristics.  We describe them in turn. 
 
RISK1  
Our first measure of risk-taking (RISK1) is 5|1
1
1
1
2
1
,,,,, ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= ∑ ∑= = TETET
T
t
T
t
tcitciciσ , 
where ∑
=
−= tc
N
k tck
tck
tctci
tci
tci A
EBITDA
NA
EBITDA
E
,
1 ,,
,,
,,,
,,
,,
1 , and Nc,t is the total number of firms within country 
c for year t.  That is, for each firm with available earnings and total assets for at least five years 
across 1992-2002, we compute the deviation of the firm’s EBITDA/Assets from the country 
average for the corresponding year.  We then calculate the standard deviation of this measure, for 
each firm (subtracting ∑
=
T
t
tciET 1
,,
1  from tciE ,,  has the effect of taking away the time invariant 
firm-specific factor in EBITDA/Asset).  Hence, each firm receives a single value.  EBITDA is 
the sum of depreciation and amortization (data item #11) and operating income after depreciation 
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(data item #14), scaled by the contemporaneous total assets (data item #89).  Prior to computing 
the risk-taking proxy, the demeaned profitability measure tciE ,,  is winsorized at 0.5% in both 
tails of the distribution to account for possible data errors.   
 
RISK2 
We use ci,σ  as the dependent variable in regression (10).  This sampling gives more 
weight to countries with more firms.  To address this bias, we also use a second measure, the 
average of ci ,σ  within a given country so that each country has only one observation.  We denote 
this cσ  (RISK2).   
Regression (10) aims to identify association between return volatility and corporate 
accountability.  The ci ,σ  and cσ  measures, however, may be influenced by firm level income 
smoothing (Ball et al. (2000) and Leuz et al. (2003).)  If income smoothing is more aggressive 
and more prevalent in countries with low corporate accountability, it may render ci,σ  and cσ  
lower; in that case, observing lower risk-taking in countries with low corporate accountability 
may not imply that firms in the latter undertake less risky operations.   
 
RISK3 
While we attempt to control for the potential firm level income smoothing in 
specifications of (10), we also address the concern with an imputed measure of risk-taking.  First, 
we use US earnings data to compute an industry-by-industry risk score, jUSA ,19971994−σ , based on 
the observation that US cashflow data, while certainly not perfect, is subject to less earnings 
smoothing than data from other countries (Leuz et al. (2003) and Bhattacharya et al. (2002)).  
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of a firm’s EBITDA/Assets from industry j’s average in year t, and also the deviation of industry 
j’s average EBITDA/Assets in year t from its sample average, but the deviation of economy-
wide average in year t from its sample average is netted out.  jUSA ,19971994−σ  captures the 
corresponding variance measure.   
Prior to computing jUSA ,19971994−σ  we winsorize tjiUSAE ,,  at 0.5% in both tails of its 
distribution to account for data errors.  We use only single business segment firms, identified 
through the Compustat segments file.  tjiUSAEBITDA ,,  is data item #13 (Operating Income Before 
Depreciation) and tjiUSAA ,,  refers to data item #6 (Total Assets), both from Compustat North 
America for 1994-1997.  We start in 1994 in order to exclude the recession years preceding 
1994.  The sample ends in 1997 because business unit reporting changed in that year (in 1997, 
FAS 131 changed the way companies reported their segments, rendering comparisons of US 
segments pre- and post-1998 difficult).  We include only firms with sales of at least $10 million. 
 We use jUSA ,19971994−σ  to impute the score of country “risk-taking.”  The score is 
calculated for each country over 1992-2002 (in table 5 panels A and B) or 1992-2000 (in table 5 
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panel C.)  The imputed risk scores are obtained as follows: 
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cjtc MVMV σ , where j is an industry subscript based on 3-
digit SIC codes, c is a country subscript, t is a year subscript, cjtMV ,,  is the total market 
capitalization of companies in industry j in year t in country c.  We name that RISK3.  The 
concept of constructing this index is that countries that have allocated more investments into 
“riskier” industries will have a higher cΩ  score. 
 In computing cΩ  we include only firms with sales above $10 million.  Market 
capitalizations (MV) are computed as of the end of the fiscal year.  Prices and shares outstanding 
for the sample firms are compiled from Compustat Global Issue database.  Thus, cΩ  is the simple 
average over 1992 - 2002 of country c’s annual value-weighted average of risk scores, 
j
USA
,19971994−σ .  
 
A.2. Measuring corporate accountability 
To characterize corporate accountability in each country, we use three measures: the 
quality of accounting standards or disclosure (ASR), the rule of law (RL), and an index of anti-
director rights (ADR).  We use accounting standards as a proxy for corporate accountability 
since it represents the level of company disclosure within a country.  The presumption is that 
higher disclosure makes corporate resources diversion more difficult.  The variable is retrieved 
from La Porta et al. (1998) who tabulate the original data from the Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research.9     
                                                 
9 The variable represents a count of the inclusion or omission of 90 accounting items in a sample of 1990 annual 
reports.  These items fall into seven categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, fund flow 
statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special items). 
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We supplement accounting standards (ASR) with the rule of law (RL) as an indicator of 
the effectiveness of enforcement of the regulations.  The source of the data is also La Porta et al. 
(1998).  RL is calculated as “average of the months of April and October of the monthly index 
between 1982 and 1995.”  The scale of this variable is from zero to 10, with lower scores for less 
tradition for law and order.  
Third, we include the anti-director rights index (from La Porta et al. (1998)) as a gauge of 
the level of protection of shareholders from managerial stealing (Table 1 spells out the index 
details.)  
The institutional measures are dated in 1990 or mid nineties and our data sample is from 
1992 to 2002.  In spite of these time differences, the data are likely to represent the institutional 
environment in our sample period fairly well to the extent that institutional regimes tend not to 
change rapidly.   
 
A.3. Measuring growth 
 
Firm level growth is measured as the average of the growth in total assets (item #89) and 
in sales (item #1) over the sample period, 1992-2002.  Prior to computing the growth measures 
we convert all accounting data items into US$ at the average monthly exchange rate as of the 
fiscal year end month.  We winsorize the average assets and sales growth variables at the 0.5% 
level on both sides of the distribution.   
For country growth we use two measures: real per-capita GDP growth and Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) growth.  Real GDP is measured in 1995 constant US$.  The nominal GDP, 
the GDP deflator and population data are obtained from the International Financial Statistics of 
the IMF.  To measure TFP we follow the algorithm in King and Levine (1993a, 1993b).  We use 
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the recursive formulation, tctctctc KIKK ,,,1, δ−+=+ , where c and t are country and time 
subscripts.  K and I are, respectively, the real capital stock and real investment in country c in 
year t, and δ  is the rate of depreciation, which we set to 7% as in the above mentioned studies.  
We start the recursion by assuming that the capital stock is zero in 1950 (the beginning of the 
data provided by Penn World Tables (PWT) version 6.1).  Iterating forward we obtain the capital 
stock for each year in 1992-2000 (currently the last date with available data in PWT).  We then 
define capital stock per capita, k, as the ratio of the real capital stock to the population. The 
productivity growth is finally defined as ( ) ( )ky ln3.0ln ∆−∆ , where the capital stock intensity is 
assumed to be 30% across all countries. 
 
A.4. Control Variables 
 
Competition 
The vector of control variables in regression (10) includes factors known to explain the 
cross-section of earnings volatility, such as competition, earnings smoothing, debt- and equity-
market development, and firm size.  Philippon (2002) suggests that product market competition 
contributes to volatile firm markups and thus to higher volatility in firm profits.  To distinguish 
the effect of competition from the impact of governance mechanisms, we attempt to control for 
competition.  We use a Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squared shares of firm sales 
to total sales within a given country, averaged for the period 1992-2002, ∑∑ ∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t i tcj
tci
c s
s
T
H
2
,,
,,1 , 
where tcjs ,,  is the sales of company j from country c in fiscal year t.  
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Earnings smoothing 
Our second concern is that, as indicated earlier, our risk-taking measures may be 
influenced not only by the fundamental volatility of the investment projects but also by earnings 
smoothing incentives.  Leuz et al. (2003) suggest that earnings management is used to conceal 
firm performance from outsiders, and argue that strong protection for investors limits private 
benefits of control and thus reduces managerial incentives to mask firm performance.  To control 
for earnings smoothing we use a measure in Leuz et al. (2003), the ratio of the standard deviation 
of operating income (OI) and the standard deviation of operating cash flow (where both variables 
are scaled with lagged total assets),  5.022002
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Leuz et al. (2003) interprets lower values of this measure as evidence of higher level of earnings 
smoothing.  In other words, earnings smoothing is high when the standard deviation of reported 
earnings relative to the standard deviation of earnings free of accrual is low.  To facilitate 
interpretation we change the sign to ES2 = 1 – ES1 so that higher values indicate higher 
propensity for earnings smoothing.   In the above, operating cash-flow is defined as operating 
income (Compustat Global item #14) minus accruals, where accruals are calculated as 
( ) ( ) titititititicti DEPTPSTDCLCASHCAACCRUALS ,,,,,,,, −∆−∆−∆−∆−∆= , where CA is total current assets 
(#75), CASH is cash or cash equivalents (#60), CL is total current liabilities (#104), STD is 
short-term debt (item #94), TP is taxes payable (#100), and DEP is depreciation expense (#11); 
all from Compustat Global.  The i indexes the company in point.  In regression (10) with 
dependent variable RISK1, ES2 is a firm level variable.  When we conduct the regression using 
country-level dependent variables (RISK2 and RISK3), ES2 is the median of the firm level 
observations in each country.   
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Financial Development 
We also control for equity and debt market development in the growth regressions (11) 
and (12).  Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) argue that at early stages of development the degree of 
risk-sharing the economy can achieve is limited; hence undertaking risky investments is less 
desirable for risk-averse managers whose human capital is under-diversified.  As financial 
markets develop, risk avoidance diminishes since risk sharing is more readily achievable.  
Capital market development plays a crucial role in the reallocation of capital too: countries with 
developed financial markets may swiftly shift resources from declining industries to growing 
ones (Wurgler (2000)) and in the process generate volatility in the corporate cashflow stream.  
To control for financial development we use the 1991 stock market capitalization and the private 
domestic credit and non-financial domestic credit (as shares of the GDP) from Demirguç-Kunt 
and Levine (2001).   
 
Other controls 
In the growth regressions (11) and (12) we further incorporate standard controls, 
including real per-capita GDP, financial market development and human capital accumulation 
proxy (the average number of years of schooling as of 1990 from Barro and Lee (1993)).  Since 
our growth regressions time window is from 1992 to 2002, these variables are measured at pre-
1992 values.   
Finally, our various risk-taking measures are aimed to capture inherent risks in firm-level 
operations.  However, the volatility measures are undoubtedly affected by macro-volatility.  We 
consider two steps to address this.  First, our volatility measures are based on the deviation of 
accounting returns from market averages.  Second, to set aside major macro-volatility shocks 
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(e.g., financial crises) that may impact our results, we exclude well-documented macroeconomic 
shocks from our data as follows: Argentina (1997 and 2001), Brazil (1997), Colombia (1997), 
Hong Kong (1997), Indonesia (1998, 1999), Malaysia (1997), Singapore (1997), Korea (1997), 
Thailand (1997 and 1998), and Turkey (2000 and 2001) (Li et al. (2004)).  
 
B. Data summary and univariate results 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables at the country level.  The sample is 
chosen based on the requirement that data are available to compute the risk scores above.  That 
leaves us with a sample of thirty-eight countries.  The sample of firms included per countries 
varies from 13 firms (Columbia) to 1,818 (United States).10  Table 3 reports the pair-wise 
country  correlations among the main variables.  The correlation between the two country risk-
taking variables, RISK2 ( cσ ) and RISK3 ( cΩ ) is 36%, and is statistically significant.  As 
discussed above, we deliberately create the cΩ  measure to be different from cσ  because we are 
concerned about the representativeness of cσ  as fundamental “risk-taking.”  The significant and 
positive correlation between the two is indicative that fundamental risk-taking may indeed be the 
driving force in both.  We further notice that the index of earnings smoothing is negatively 
associated with RISK2.  Thus, the skepticism that high volatility of firm level accounting returns 
may be partly due to low earnings smoothing is substantiated.  
Both country-level measures of risk-taking are positively correlated with the three 
corporate accountability variables: the quality of accounting standards (ASR), the rule of law 
(RL), and anti-director rights (ADR).  Of these, the correlations of RISK2 ( cσ ) with ASR (51%) 
and with ADR (27%) are statistically significant while the correlation of RISK2 with RL is not.  
                                                 
10 Rajan and Zingales (1995) discuss at length the reporting bias present in Compustat Global Vantage. See 
robustness checks section for further discussion. 
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At the same time, the correlations of RISK3 ( cΩ ) with ASR (49%) and RL (36%) are significant, 
however, its correlation with ADR is not.  These univariate results provide some support for our 
first hypothesis.  Figures 1 through 3 show these correlations, which are visibly positive.  
Economies with less competitive intensity, as judged by a higher Herfindahl index, tend 
to score lower on our risk-taking measures (the correlation coefficients are -10% for RISK2 and –
41% for RISK3, the latter of which is statistically significant).  This appears consistent with the 
conjecture that intense competition increases the volatility of earnings (Philippon (2002)). 
Finally, both country-level risk-taking measures are positively correlated with growth in 
real per-capita GDP and in total factor productivity.  The scattered plots are shown in Figures 4 
and 5.  However, the correlations are not statistically significant.  Either the hypothesized 
relationship does not exist, or perhaps the correlation omits variable important for growth.  
 
IV. Multivariate results 
A. Firm level tests 
We present our multivariate results in Tables 4 and 5, corresponding to firm-level and 
country-level tests. We start by examining the firm level results (Table 4).  In Panel A we present 
the determinants of the firm-level risk-taking proxy (RISK1).  We include anti-director rights 
(ADR), accounting disclosure standards (ASR), the rule of law (RL), earnings smoothing, firm 
size, country level competition intensity (“country Herfindahl index”) and proxies for financial 
development.  Also included are 3-digit SIC code industry fixed effects.11  The regression results 
are consistent with our first hypothesis – the corporate accountability measures all have a 
                                                 
11 In the firm level regression, we could model the error terms as showing industry fixed effects or random effects.  
The Hausman specification test statistics is 84.86 and thus rejects the null hypothesis of the existence of random 
effects. 
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positive and statistically significant relation with firm-level risk-taking.  They are significant 
whether entered individually or together.   
Certain other variables also behave generally as expected.  The earnings smoothing proxy 
attracts a negative coefficient, indicating that higher earnings smoothing is associated with lower 
volatility of accounting returns.  Higher firm concentration, which we interpret as lower 
competitive intensity, is associated with lower volatility of accounting returns.   
Our last control variables, the claims on the private sector by financial institutions and the 
stock market capitalization (both as shares of GDP) are more surprising.  Their negative 
regression coefficients may reflect that in countries with high levels of loan financing, firms 
undertake less risky investments because that is what lenders prefer (Morck and Nakamura 
(2000)).  Still that would not explain the negative coefficient on the equity market capitalization.  
Another possibility is that we have high collinearity – the capital market development measures 
are all highly correlated with accounting disclosure standards (ASR), the rule of law (RL), and 
anti-director rights (ADR).  We observe negative signs on equity market capitalization in firm 
growth regressions in Panel B as well.  While these results are problematic, the previous 
literature has reported similar results.12   
Using model (4) in Table 4 Panel A, we compute the economic significance of the 
estimated coefficients.  All three investor protection variables are highly statistically significant.  
Of the three, the one with most economic impact is anti-director rights (ADR).  A one standard 
deviation increase in ADR is associated with an increase in the risk-taking proxy by 10.31% of 
its mean.  A one standard deviation increase in the rule of law index (RL) increases the risk-
                                                 
12 For example, Beck and Levine (2002) find results similar to ours: when both judicial efficiency (which is highly 
correlated with investor protection) and financial development are included as explanatory variables for industry 
growth across countries, only the former is significant and positive while the latter is negative and insignificant.  
Similarly, Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that in regressions of excess firm growth, the coefficient on 
the equity market size as a fraction of GDP is negative and insignificant. 
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taking proxy by 9.73% of its mean.  Of the three indicators, disclosure is the least statistically 
significant.  A one standard deviation increase of disclosure increases the risk-taking proxy by 
7.57% of its mean.  Finally, among the control variables, a one standard deviation increase in the 
earnings smoothing measure decreases the risk-taking proxy by 12.72% of its mean. 
In Table 4 panel B we relate two measures of firm-level growth, growth in total book 
value of assets and growth in sales, to the company level risk-taking proxy, ci,σ .  Both asset and 
sales growth are winsorized at the 0.5% level in both tails of the distribution.  The regression 
controls for the three measures of investor protection, as well as for firm size and financial 
market development.  For both growth variables, the regression coefficient for the risk-taking 
proxy is positive and statistically significant.  The regressions are performed with industry fixed 
effects and control for firm size, credit market size, and stock market size.   
The specifications in columns 2 and 5 could be problematic.  In the first place, we include 
the investor protection variables because the law and finance literature advocates that better 
investor protections facilitate financing and thus firm growth (La Porta et al. (1997, 2002), 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)).  Yet, we should note that the risk-taking measures are 
constructed proxies for the real risks in operations; and as such they are bound to have noise.  
Because of the noise, they may even be more inferior proxies for real risks in operations than the 
investor protection variables.  Hence, observing that our risk-taking proxies do not significantly 
explain growth in the presence of investor protection proxies does not necessarily imply that 
risk-taking has no relationship with growth.  It could reflect that our risk taking proxy contains a 
great deal of measurement error.  Indeed, the ability of our risk-taking proxies to explain growth 
is reduced when the investor protection variables are included in the regressions: the risk-taking 
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proxies are significant in all specifications, by more so in (1) and (4) than in (2) and (5) where 
the investor protection controls are included.   
One way to tackle the issue is to instrument for the risk-taking proxy, and compare the 
predictive power of the regression that includes the instrumented risk-taking proxy, (models (3) 
and (6)) with the explanatory power of the regression with the investor protection variables 
only.13  We obtained the predicted risk-taking proxy as   
           ( )RLASRADRE cici ,,|,, σσ = .    
(13) 
We start by comparing models 2 and 3.  Notice that the F-statistic is higher for model 3 as 
compared to model 2; a similar comparisons holds for the models 5 and 6.  Based on the Bayes 
information criterion (BIC), model 3 performs equally well as model 2.  However, model 6 
performs slightly better than model 5 based on BIC.  These results indicate that models 3 and 6 
perform at least as well as models 2 and 5.14  
Using model 3 a one standard deviation increase in the instrumented volatility is 
associated with an increase in the asset growth of 61.9% (the figure using model 2 is 8.91%).  
Similarly, based on model 6 a one standard deviation in the instrumented volatility proxy above 
its mean would increase the sales growth with 65.10% (the figure using model 5 is 13.07%)15.   
 
B. Country-level tests 
                                                 
13 We include only the predicted risk-taking variable and do not include the investor protection institutional 
variables in the growth regressions (3) and (6) the former and latter are collinear by definition. 
14 In unreported results we have also compared the explanatory power of models 3 and 6 to models that include only 
the investor protection and control variables. These comparisons suggest that models 3 and 6 are the more 
parsimonious than models 2 and 5. 
15 The controls reveal that larger firms have higher sales and assets growth.  Firms from countries with more 
developed debt and equity markets have slower sales and asset growth.  As discussed previously, even though we 
can not explain these latter results, we note that they mimic those in Beck and Levine (2002) and Demirguç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998). 
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A concern in the firm-level results is that more weight is given to countries with more 
firm-level observations.  These are likely more advanced economies with better corporate 
governance foundations.  A conservative approach is to give each country an equal weight by 
using only country level average of the firm level observations; that is, use RISK2 instead of 
RISK1.  Such an approach sacrifices information but avoids over-weighting large economies.  
Results of the analysis are presented in Table 5.   
Panel A reports regressions of our country level risk-taking proxy (RISK2) on disclosure, 
the rule of law, and anti-director rights.  Model 1 reveals that disclosure is significantly positive.  
The rule of law coefficient is positive but only weakly significant, as shown in model 2.  The 
anti-director rights variable is even weaker.  When all three institutional variables are included, 
only the disclosure variable attracts a significant regression coefficient, although the three 
variables are jointly significant.  Thus, the more conservative approach of RISK2 generates 
results that broadly support the prediction that better investor protection increases risk-taking 
propensity.  
In terms of economic significance (based on model 4) a one standard deviation increase 
in disclosure increases the risk-taking proxy by 16.92% of its mean.  A one standard deviation 
increase in the rule of law increases the risk-taking proxy by 18% of its mean.  A one standard 
deviation increase in anti-director rights increases the risk-taking proxy by 5.3% of its mean.   
Panels B and C report the relationship between our country level risk-taking proxy and 
country growth.  Model 2 in Panel B includes the risk-taking proxy and the investor protection 
variables in the same regression, in which case the explanatory power of the risk-taking proxy 
diminishes.  As discussed above, this could indicate either that our hypothesis is not supported, 
or that our risk-taking proxy is (i) too closely correlated with the institutional variables and (ii) 
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too noisy to compete with them.  We therefore also report model 3 using the projection of our 
risk-taking proxy on the institutional variables, cσ  [ ( )RLASRADRE cc ,,|σσ = ] to represent 
risk-taking, as we did in the firm-level regressions.  The predicted level of risk-taking cσ , 
attracts a positive and weakly significant coefficient in the full sample regression.  Still, based on 
a comparison of the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) for the two models, model 3 does not 
perform better than model 1, in which the investor protection variables are used instead of cσ .  
Thus, these results do not provide significant support to the proposition that high risk-taking 
contributes to per-capita real GDP growth.   
Panel C of Table 5 reports regressions using total factor productivity as the dependent 
variable.  The regression specifications are otherwise identical to those in table 5 panel B.  Here, 
the predicted risk-taking measure ( cσ ) now out-performs regressions that replace variables with 
the original investor protection variables.  The results indicate statistical significance on the 
instrumented risk-taking proxy.  Note also that in comparing model 3 to models 1 and 2, the 
model using the predicted risk-taking measure produce marginally better AIC, BIC and F-
statistics.  We interpret these as support for the hypothesis that our risk-taking measures are 
associated with higher productivity growth.   
 
C. Multivariate results using RISK3 measure  
The above results in B, some of which are statistically weak, may reflect the fact that our 
country-level risk-taking proxy (RISK2) is noisy.  It certainly is affected by earnings 
management given its inverse relationship to income-smoothing.  This concern motivates the 
third risk-taking measure RISK3 ( cΩ ), which is an industry value-weighted average of risk-
taking measures using US data.  As argued above, RISK3 may be subject to less earnings 
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management since it utilizes data from the country with relatively modest earnings smoothing.  
The right panel of Table 5A reports regressions using RISK3 as a dependent variable.  Among all 
the investor protection institutional variables, the strongest determinant of imputed risk-taking is 
the accounting disclosure variable.  It is positive and highly significant in all specifications.  
Based on model 5 in Table 5 panel A, a one standard deviation increase in disclosure increases 
the risk-taking proxy by 8.62% of its mean.  Both anti-director rights and rule of law indicators 
are insignificant, the latter even has the opposite sign.  Still, these results fit our theoretical 
results because disclosure is the institutional environmental variable that most directly captures 
the likelihood of discovering managerial stealing; the anti-director and the rule of law variables 
are indirect measures of what we intend to capture.   
Table 5B model 4 is the regression of real per-capita GDP growth on RISK3 ( cΩ ), and on 
the institutional environment variables, controlling for various initial conditions.  We also show, 
in model 5 the results for the projected RISK3 ( cΩ ) defined as 
            ( )ADRRLASRE cc ,,|Ω=Ω   
 (14) 
Model 5 shows that the coefficient on cΩ  is positive and significant.  That model is 
marginally more parsimonious than model 4, as measured by the AIC and BIC, where the 
investor protection variables are directly entered.  Based on model 5 a one standard deviation 
increase of cΩ  is associated with a 32.68% increase in real GDP-per-capita growth from its 
mean.  
Model 4 in Table 5 panel C is the regression of productivity growth measures on RISK3 
( cΩ ) and on the institutional environment variables.  Model 5 is the regression on the projected 
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RIK3 ( cΩ ).  We observe that cΩ  attracts a positive and statistically significant coefficient.  
Also, in comparing the specifications that using the projected risks measure cΩ  and the investor 
protection variables directly (model 4), we find that the former is marginally more parsimonious 
than the latter in terms of AIC and BIC statistics.  Based on model 5 a one standard deviation 
increase of cΩ  is associated with a 45.73% increase of the TFP growth above its mean.  Overall, 
we have shown limited evidence that there exists a positive association between risk-taking and 
investor protection and a positive association between risk-taking and growth.  We now offer 
more robustness checks on these results. 
 
D. Robustness Checks 
A drawback of the Compustat Global Vantage is its limited firm coverage (Rajan and 
Zingales (1995)).  Firms that are selected to be included in this database are likely the ones that 
are attractive to global investors and are able to overcome their home countries’ investor 
protection problems.  This selection bias reduces the dependence of firm-level governance on 
country-level institutions and would tend to work against our hypotheses.  Yet, we find 
affirmative evidence for our hypotheses. Home-country institutions seem to remain the dominant 
factor in corporate governance (Doidge et al. (2004)).  
Finally, including firms that have cross-listed their stock may weaken our results since 
their governance is likely less affected by the host country institutional environment.  To 
investigate these issues, we repeat our regressions from Table 4 Panels A and B but restrict our 
sample to non-cross-listed firms.  We obtained stronger results (available upon request).   
 
V. Conclusions 
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In this paper we consider the relationship between investor protection and risk-taking by 
perk-consuming managers.  In our model, managers choose their optimal level of perk 
consumption taking into account the degree of investor protection in place in the embedding 
economy.  Since perks represent a priority claim held by the managers, larger perks align their 
incentives more closely with these of debt holders in their choice of investment risk – with the 
implication that managers may skip risky but value-enhancing projects to protect their perk 
consumption.  Better investor protection, on the other hand, lowers the optimal level of perks, 
causing managers to be less risk-averse and better aligned with shareholders in their investment 
risk choices.  The basic predictions are that managers residing in better-protected investor 
regimes will take on more value-enhancing risks and achieve faster firm growth.  
We test the implications of our model in an unbalanced panel of manufacturing 
companies from thirty-eight countries from the Compustat Global Vantage covering 1992-2002.  
Consistent with theoretical predictions, we document significant positive relationships between 
various firm- and country- level risk-taking measures and measures of corporate accountability, 
and also between risk-taking and growth.  Our results are generally robust to controls for firm 
earnings management, competition in the local economy, financial market development, and 
general economic development. 
We believe that this study contributes to the broader literatures on investor protection and 
growth in several important ways.  First, we provide a novel explanation for why better investor 
protection leads to faster growth.  Second, our study is the first to empirically document an 
impact of risk-taking on growth.  We hope that future research on investor protection and growth 
will shed further light o this potentially.  
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Appendix. 
Proof of proposition 2. We consider three cases. 
Case 1: “Low” perk consumption, ( )
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Proof of Proposition 3. We consider three cases. 
Case 1: “Low” perk consumption, ( )
2
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Case 2: “Medium” perk consumption, ( ) LgI ≥−> 2
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Case 3: “High” perk consumption, ( ) IgH ≥−> 2
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Optimal Compensation.  In this section we address the optimality of the incentives given to 
the manager, α .  In equilibrium, incentives will be set to equate the first best investment policy, 
q , to the second best one, q~ .  Since the discussed investment distortion arises when 
( ) Lg ≥− 222 41 αφ , the optimal incentives solve qq =~ .  We substitute for both and force16 
LH
LI
ALH
ALI
−
−=+−
+− , where ( ) 2
2
1 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−= α
φ gLA .  The solution to the above is A = 0, or ( ) LL 21 φα −= .  
Under this incentive scheme the manager would receive the same level of perks in any state of 
the world, ( ) 222 41 αφ gL −= , regardless of her project choice.  However, if φ  is sufficiently 
low in a sense to become clear below, it might not be possible to award the manager such 
incentives.  Providing high-powered incentives (which in our model take the form of ownership 
stake), e.g. the entire cashflow, 1=α , when 0=φ , would effectively require the manager to buy 
a large fraction of the firm.  Since the manager might be wealth-constrained, the maximum share 
of the entire firm that could be given to her could only be 
V
W
W =α , where W  is the wealth of 
the manager and V  is the rationally anticipated value of the firm.  Thus, in equilibrium, the 
optimal amount of incentives is given by { }WL ααα ,min* = .  Thus if LW αα < , there will be a 
set of *α , such that ( ) Lg >− 222 41 αφ over which 0~ <∂∂φq .  In our framework so far the manager 
is assumed to be risk-averse in her perk consumption.  However, if she is assumed to be risk 
averse in her contracted compensation too, high levels of incentives could also have an impact on 
her choice of risk.  The hedging demands due to risk-aversion in her preferences would lead to 
an optimal level of incentives, Rα .  Therefore the optimal ownership stake is given by 
{ }WRL αααα ,,min* = .  Notice that if LW αα <  or RW αα < , Wαα =* .  In this case all our results 
                                                 
16 Notice we equate q~ from case (b) in Proposition 2 to q . Finding an optimal α  that equates  q~  to q  effectively 
eliminates the distortion that arises in case (c) of Proposition (2) as well. 
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continue to hold for the endogenously determined value of α  where the binding constraint on α  
is determined by the wealth constraint of the manager, and we replace α  by Wα  in all these 
results. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions. 
Main Variables Definition Source 
Risk-taking variables   
Company risk-taking 
proxy RISK1, ci,σ  We compute company earnings volatility, 5|111 1
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1 , and Nc,t indexes the firms within country c and year t. That is, for 
each firm with available earnings and total assets for at least five years in 1992-2002 we compute the deviation of the 
firm’s EBITDA/Assets from the country average (for the corresponding year) and then calculate the standard deviation 
of this measure for each firm. tciE ,,  is winsorized at 0.5% on both sides of the sample distribution to account for data 
entry omissions. 
 
Compustat Global 
Industrial/Commercial 
Annual Database. 
Country risk-taking 
proxy RISK2, cσ  
The average of the company risk-taking proxy (RISK1), ∑
=
≥= c
N
i
cci
c
c NN 1
, 2|
1 σσ .  
 
Compustat Global 
Industrial/Commercial 
Annual Database. 
Imputed risk score 
RISK3, cΩ  
Calculated for each country over the period 1992-2002. The imputed risk scores are obtained using the following 
formula, 
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on 3-digit SIC codes, c is a country subscript, t is a year subscript, cjtMV ,,  is the market capitalization in industry j 
in year t for country c, and j
USA
,19971994−σ  is the industry j risk score computed using only US single business 
segment firms for the period 1994-1997. In the computation of j
USA
,19971994−σ  we include firm-years where sales are 
above 10 million US$.  Market values (MV) are computed as of the end of the fiscal year.  Prices and shares 
outstanding data is compiled from Global Vantage Issue database.  The  jUSA ,19971994−σ  is computed as the within-
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σ  where j indexes the 
manufacturing industries defined as 3-digit SIC codes and i  indexes the companies within a given industry. Prior to 
computing j
USA
,19971994−σ  we winsorize tjiUSAE ,,  at 0.5% on both sides of its distribution to account for data entry 
omissions.  The single business segment firms are identified from the Compustat Segment file. EBITDA corresponds to 
data item #13 (Operating Income Before Depreciation) and A refers to data item #6 (Total Assets), both from 
Compustat North America, for the period 1994-1997. We start in 1994 to avoid the recession years preceding it. The 
sample ends in 1997 to account for the changed US practices of reporting business units as of 1997 (FAS 131 changed 
the rules of reporting segments, rendering comparisons of US segments pre- and post-1997 imprecise). 
 
Compustat Global 
Industrial/Commercial 
Annual Database 
and 
Compustat North 
Americal Industrial 
Annual Database. 
Growth Variables   
Real-GDP-per capita 
growth 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP. The latter is measured in 1995 constant US$. The nominal GDP, GDP deflator and 
population data, used to compute it are obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. We use the line 
data item 99bvp and 99bvr that are presented on a reference year 1995 (GDP volume index assumed 100 in 1995) in 
the IFC yearbook. 
 
International 
Financial Statistics of 
the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Total Factor 
Productivity growth 
To measure TFP we follow algorithm similar to King and Levine (1994). We use the recursion 
tctctctc KIKK ,,,1, δ−+=+ , where c indexes countries, t is the time period, K is the real capital stock in year t and 
country c, I is the real capital investment in year t and country c, and δ  is the rate of depreciation, which in accord 
with previous studies we assume to be the same across all countries, 7%. We start the recursion by assuming that in 
1950 (the beginning of the data by Penn World Tables version 6.1) the capital stock is 0. Iterating forward we obtain 
the capital stock for each year in 1992-2000 (the last date with available data in PWT). We then define capital stock per 
capita, k, as the ratio of the real capital stock to the population. The productivity growth is finally defined as: ( ) ( )ky ln3.0ln ∆−∆ , where the capital stock intensity is assumed 30% across all countries. 
 
Penn World Tables, 
version 6.1. 
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Average assets growth Average assets (line item #89) growth over the sample period, 1992-2002. Prior to computing the growth we convert 
all accounting data in US$. We have further winsorized the assets at the 0.5% level on both sides of the sample 
distribution. 
 
Compustat Global 
Industrial/Commercial 
Annual Database. 
Average sales growth Average sales (line item #1) growth over the sample period, 1992-2002. Prior to computing the growth we convert all 
accounting data in US$. We have further winsorized the sales at the 0.5% level on both sides of the sample distribution. 
 
Compustat Global 
Industrial/Commercial 
Annual Database. 
Investor Protection Variables 
Rule of Law (RL) Rule of law is the assessment of the law and order tradition of the country.  Calculated as “average of the months of 
April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from zero to 10, with lower scores for less 
tradition for law and order.” 
 
International Country 
Risk Guide; Quotation 
is from La Porta et al. 
(1998). 
Rating of Accounting 
Standards (ASR) 
Index that is created by “examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual report on their inclusion or omission of 90 
items. These items fall into seven categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, fund flow 
statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special items). A minimum of three companies in each country were 
studied.” Approximately 70% of the companies screened are industrials, while the remaining 30% represent financials. 
Center for 
International 
Financial Analysis 
and Research. 
Quotation is from La 
Porta et al. (1998)  
Anti-director rights 
(ADR) 
An index that aggregates shareholder rights. “The index is formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the 
general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of 
directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share capital 
that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the 
sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. The index 
ranges from zero to six.” 
 
Quotation is from La 
Porta et al. (1998) 
Control Variables   
Earnings Smoothing  A measure of earnings smoothing due to managerial incentives. Computed in Ball, Kothari, Robin (2000) and used 
also in Bhattacharya, Daouk, Welker (2002), and in Leuz, Nanda, Wysocki (2003). It is computed as the ratio of the 
firm level standard deviations of operating income (OI) and operating cash flow where both variables are scaled with 
lagged total assets, 5.022002
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. The 
higher the value of this measure, the lower earnings smoothing is. To facilitate interpretation, we thus consider the 
modified measure 
12 1 ESES −= , for which higher values indicate higher level of earnings smoothing. Operating cash-
flow is equal to operating income (Compustat Global item #14) minus accruals, where accruals are calculated as ( ) ( ) titititititicti DEPTPSTDCLCASHCAACCRUALS ,,,,,,,, −∆−∆−∆−∆−∆= , where CA is total current assets 
(item #75), CASH is cash or cash equivalents (#60), CLS is total current liabilities (#104), and STD is short-term debt 
(item #94), TP is taxes payable (#100), and DEP is depreciation expense (#11); I indexes the company in point. We 
compute the country analogous measure to the above one as the median firm ratio for each country. 
 
Compustat Global 
Industrial/Commercial 
Annual Database. 
Herfindahl Index To control for competition we use a Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of the squared shares of firm sales to total 
sales within a given country for the period 1992-2002, ∑∑ ∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t i tcj
tci
c s
s
T
H
2
,,
,,1 , where tcjs ,,  is the sales of 
company j from country c in fiscal year t. 
Compustat Global 
Industrial/Commercial 
Annual Database. 
Private Credit Claims on private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as share of GDP. Beck, Demirguç-Kunt 
and Levine (2003) 
Market Capitalization Stock market capitalization as share of GDP. Beck, Demirguç-Kunt 
and Levine (2003) 
Average Schooling Average schooling years in the total population over 25 in 1990. Barro and Lee (1993). 
1991 $ GDP-per-capita 1991 GDP-per-capita in 1995 constant US dollar terms. 
 
International 
Financial Statistics of 
the International 
Monetary Fund. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 
Descriptive statistics for country variables in our sample. The columns contents is: (1) average number of manufacturing companies per country in the sample (N), (2) standard deviation of within-
country firm EBITDA-to-asset ratio (RISK2), (3) imputed country riskiness score (RISK3), (4) earnings smoothing parameter, computed as 1-ES1 where ES1 is the earnings smoothing measure in 
Ball, Kothari, Robin (2000) (ESM), (5) average annual real GDP-per-capita growth for 1992-2002 (GDP), (6) country average Total Factor Productivity growth for 1992-2000 (TFP), (7) claims on 
private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as share of GDP (CREDIT), (8) stock market capitalization as share of GDP (MCAP), (9) rule of law (RL), (10), disclosure –
quality of the accounting standards rating (ASR), (11) anti-director rights index (ADR), (12) Herfindahl index per country (HERF), (13) 1991 GDP-per-capita in 1995 constant US dollar terms ($ 
GDP). Items seven and eight are from Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (2001). Items nine through 11 are from La Porta et al. (1998). The source of the data is Compustat Global Vantage database, for
the period 1992-2002. Prior to reporting RISK1 we have subtracted from the raw ratios a mean country ratio, for every year. We have included manufacturing firms (SIC codes 2000-3999) only. 
 
 Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Country N RISK2 RISK3 ESM GDP TFP CREDIT MCAP RL  ASR ADR HERF $ GDP 
Argentina 15 0.062 0.128 0.35 -0.1% 2.7% 0.15 0.05 5.35 45 4 0.25 $5,771 
Australia 101 0.077 0.097 0.21 2.6% 2.1% 0.81 0.43 10 75 4 0.07 $18,302 
Austria 53 0.040 0.082 0.58 1.6% 1.0% 0.87 0.07 10 54 2 0.14 $21,652 
Belgium 54 0.041 0.088 0.50 2.3% 1.1% 0.37 0.26 10 61 0 0.14 $20,320 
Brazil 84 0.052 0.076 0.42 1.5% 1.6% 0.25 0.12 6.32 54 3 0.18 $2,712 
Canada 224 0.090 0.121 0.21 3.2% 1.6% 0.77 0.46 10 74 5 0.03 $21,057 
Chile 41 0.030 0.055 0.45 3.9% 2.6% 0.50 0.43 7.02 52 5 0.23 $2,601 
Colombia 13 0.022 0.093 0.39 0.6% -0.1% 0.27 0.06 2.08 50 3 0.34 $1,347 
Denmark 73 0.050 0.158 0.33 2.0% 1.6% 0.42 0.22 10 62 2 0.07 $26,035 
Finland 64 0.047 0.147 0.30 2.4% 2.7% 0.67 0.18 10 77 3 0.09 $24,627 
France 264 0.044 0.117 0.40 1.4% 0.9% 0.91 0.20 8.98 69 3 0.05 $20,923 
Germany 313 0.060 0.115 0.50 1.1% 0.3% 0.92 0.19 9.23 62 1 0.05 $22,135 
Greece 25 0.033 0.052 0.41 2.4% 2.5% 0.40 0.08 6.18 55 2 0.24 $8,813 
Hong Kong 45 0.067 0.109 0.41 2.0% 0.8% 1.36 1.28 8.22 69 5 0.09 $14,947 
India 184 0.048 0.082 0.38 4.0% 2.7% 0.27 0.13 4.17 57 5 0.10 $339 
Indonesia 62 0.060 0.092 0.32 4.5% 2.9% 0.26 0.05 3.98 - 2 0.16 $708 
Ireland 22 0.047 0.135 0.21 6.4% 5.3% 0.63 0.27 7.8 - 4 0.14 $13,546 
Israel 25 0.062 0.075 0.32 1.1% 0.9% 0.51 0.29 4.82 64 3 0.18 $11,956 
Italy 98 0.034 0.104 0.49 1.4% 1.0% 0.51 0.12 8.33 62 1 0.14 $20,462 
Japan 768 0.021 0.128 0.41 0.8% 0.0% 1.69 0.73 8.98 65 4 0.01 $28,110 
Malaysia 222 0.069 0.102 0.46 2.7% 1.8% 0.80 1.07 6.78 76 4 0.03 $2,521 
Mexico 32 0.038 0.085 0.07 1.1% 1.1% 0.18 0.15 5.35 60 1 0.08 $3,714 
Netherlands 89 0.055 0.092 0.36 2.3% 1.7% 1.28 0.41 10 64 2 0.20 $20,058 
New Zealand 18 0.073 0.093 0.40 2.2% 1.9% 0.54 0.40 10 70 4 0.26 $12,098 
Norway 46 0.079 0.146 0.28 2.7% 2.3% 0.89 0.15 10 74 4 0.13 $27,630 
Pakistan 25 0.052 0.136 0.65 0.9% 0.9% 0.23 0.09 3.03 - 5 0.23 $396 
Philippines 22 0.082 0.094 0.40 1.1% 1.3% 0.29 0.21 2.73 65 3 0.47 $708 
Portugal 21 0.033 0.088 0.51 2.5% 1.0% 0.63 0.08 8.68 36 3 0.15 $8,207 
Singapore 107 0.058 0.142 0.35 3.2% 4.7% 0.95 1.23 8.57 78 4 0.07 $13,665 
South Africa 30 0.039 0.083 0.24 0.6% 0.8% 0.79 1.31 4.42 70 5 0.10 $3,343 
South Korea 58 0.053 0.149 0.45 4.7% 2.4% 0.81 0.25 5.35 62 2 0.14 $6,819 
Spain 59 0.038 0.053 0.33 2.2% 1.5% 0.72 0.18 7.8 64 4 0.23 $14,178 
Sweden 103 0.080 0.167 0.14 2.1% 1.5% 1.09 0.38 10 83 3 0.08 $28,724 
Switzerland 96 0.043 0.137 0.35 0.6% 0.2% 1.78 0.71 10 68 2 0.15 $34,217 
Thailand 140 0.066 0.098 0.35 5.0% 3.8% 0.68 0.26 6.25 64 2 0.06 $1,735 
Turkey 24 0.073 0.092 0.08 2.2% 0.1% 0.14 0.06 5.18 51 2 0.28 $2,636 
United Kingdom 485 0.069 0.120 0.21 2.2% 1.6% 0.74 0.76 8.57 78 5 0.05 $17,883 
United States 1,818 0.090 0.153 0.10 2.1% 1.6% 1.31 0.58 10 71 5 0.01 $23,471 
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Table 3. Pairwise Correlations of main variables. 
In this table we present correlations for the following variables that appear in our empirical work: (1) a country average of the company EBITDA-to-
assets ratio, RISK2, (2) country imputed riskiness score, RISK3, (3) average annual country real GDP-per-capita growth for 1992-2002, (4) average 
annual total factor productivity growth for 1992-2000 (smaller sample is due to data availability in PWT Version 6.1), (5) claims on private sector by
deposit money banks and other financial institutions as share of GDP, (6) stock market capitalization as share of GDP, (7) Measure of earnings
smoothing computed as ES2=1-ES1 where ES1 is the measure computed in Ball, Kothari, Robin (2000), (8) Anti-director rights index, (9) Rule of 
Law, (10) Rating on Quality of Accounting Standards, and (11) Herfindahl index per country-year. Items five and six are from Demirguç-Kunt and 
Levine (2001). Items eight through ten are from La Porta et al. (1998). Higher values of the earnings smoothing measure are associated higher levels
of smoothing. Pairwise correlations are presented in percentage values. P-values for the significance of the correlations are presented in parentheses
below. 
 
 
RISK2 
cσ  
RISK3 
cΩ  
GDP 
Growth 
 
TFP 
Growth 
 
Private 
Credit 
Market 
Cap 
Earnings 
Smoothing 
Anti-
director 
Rule of 
Law 
Disclosure 
RISK3, 
 cΩ  0.36 1.00         
 (0.03)          
           
GDP Growth 0.15 0.03 1.00        
 (0.39) (0.85)         
           
TFP Growth 0.16 0.14 0.76 1.00       
 (0.33) (0.40) (0.00)        
           
Private Credit 0.07 0.39 -0.07 -0.16 1.00      
 (0.65) (0.02) (0.68) (0.34)       
           
Market Cap 0.15 0.17 -0.04 0.02 0.57 1.00     
 (0.37) (0.32) (0.80) (0.89) (0.00)      
           
Earnings 
Smoothing -0.43 -0.21 -0.11 -0.13 -0.06 -0.14 1.00    
 (0.01) (0.20) (0.49) (0.42) (0.74) (0.41)     
           
Anti-director 0.27 0.11 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.46 -0.15 1.00   
(ADR) (0.10) (0.53) (0.64) (0.26) (0.34) (0.00) (0.36)    
           
Disclosure  0.51 0.49 0.14 0.21 0.48 0.55 -0.39 0.29 1.00  
(ASR) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.10)   
           
Rule of Law 0.17 0.36 0.06 0.03 0.61 0.19 -0.10 -0.07 0.42 1.00 
(RL) (0.30) (0.03) (0.74) (0.86) (0.00) (0.25) (0.54) (0.67) (0.01)  
           
Herfindahl -0.10 -0.41 -0.19 -0.11 -0.49 -0.41 0.22 -0.10 -0.47 -0.54 
Index (0.55) (0.01) (0.26) (0.50) (0.00) (0.01) (0.18) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 4 Panel A. Firm Level Risk-taking Regressions 
In this table we present firm-level regressions of the company risk-taking proxy ci,σ , investor protection indicators, and control variables for firm 
size, firm earnings smoothing, competition within the county, and the country financing market development. The risk-taking proxy is the time series 
standard deviation of the EBITDA/Assets company ratio, computed for 1992-2002. We include only firms for which there are at least five annual
observations on EBITDA/Assets. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficients. Earnings smoothing is one minus the
firm’s ratio of firm-level standard deviations of operating income and operating cash flow, both scaled by lagged total assets. The higher the measure,
the higher the propensity to smooth earnings. Firm size is the average total assets over 1992-2002. Reported results are obtained from regressions 
with 3-digit SIC industry code fixed effects (not shown); in addition the regression includes as control the number of observations used to estimate
the risk taking proxy (not reported). We have required that the rule of law indicator is available for the country of residence of the companies in our
sample. We consider only firms in the manufacturing industry (SIC 2000-3999). For the definition of market capitalization and private credit refer to 
Table 1. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Company Risk-taking RISK1, ci,σ  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disclosure 0.0013   0.0007 
 (8.15)   (3.56) 
Rule of Law  0.0055  0.0039 
  (7.90)  (4.49) 
Anti-Director Index   0.0054 0.0048 
   (7.03) (6.15) 
Earnings Smoothing -0.0100 -0.0102 -0.0099 -0.0095 
 (-10.41) (-10.67) (-10.34) (-9.86) 
Log (Firm Size) -0.0136 -0.0136 -0.0137 -0.0136 
 (-27.38) (-27.69) (-27.86) (-27.39) 
Country Private Credit -0.0015 -0.0188 -0.0065 -0.0104 
 (-0.56) (-6.55) (-2.54) (-3.06) 
Country Market Capitalization -0.0238 0.0010 -0.0180 -0.0203 
 (-5.87) (0.27) (-4.71) (-4.13) 
Country Herfindahl Index -0.0271 -0.0454 -0.0463 0.0031 
 (-1.52) (-2.65) (-2.68) (0.17) 
     
Number of observations 5,164 5,234 5,234 5,164 
R-squared (%) 20.4% 20.4% 20.6% 22.1% 
F-statistic 156.4 157.5 155.2 129.0 
Akaike Information  
Criterion (AIC) -15,200.0 -15,400.0 -15,400.0 -15,200.0 
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Table 4 Panel B. Firm Level Growth Regressions 
In this table we present the firm-level regressions of assets and sales growth versus risk-taking proxy, ci,σ , investor protection indicators, and
controls for firm size and financial market development. As an alternative proxy for risk-taking we include the instrumented risk-taking proxy, ( )RLASRADRE cici ,,|,, σσ = . Assets and sales growth are winsorized at the 0.5% level on both sides of the distribution. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses below the corresponding coefficients. Assets growth is computed as the growth in $ assets of the firm. Sales growth is defined 
analogously. Firm size is the average total assets over 1992-2002. Reported results are obtained from regressions with 3-digit SIC industry code fixed 
effects (not reported); in addition the regression includes as control the number of observations used to estimate the standard deviation of the 
industry-adjusted EBITDA/Assets ratio (not reported). We include only firms for which there are at least five annual observations on
EBITDA/Assets. We have required that the rule of law indicator is available for the country of residence of the companies in our sample. We
consider only manufacturing industry constituents (SIC 2000-3999). 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 Company Asset Growth Company Sales Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RISK1, ci,σ  0.1737 0.0816  0.1799 0.1013  
 (5.60) (2.65)  (5.16) (2.90)  
Predicted RISK1, ci ,σ    2.5538   2.2716 
   (16.87)   (13.35) 
Disclosure  0.0014   0.0018  
  (3.44)   (3.98)  
Rule of Law  0.0106   0.0066  
  (5.61)   (3.11)  
Anti-Director Index  0.0191   0.0162  
  (11.37)   (8.55)  
Log (Firm Size) 0.0082 0.0078 0.0067 0.0081 0.0076 0.0063 
 (6.87) (6.62) (6.16) (6.08) (5.77) (5.13) 
Country Private Credit -0.0025 -0.025 -0.0175 -0.0058 -0.0173 -0.0188 
 (-0.48) (-3.49) (-3.37) (-1.01) (-2.15) (-3.23) 
Country Market Capitalization -0.0067 -0.064 -0.0736 -0.0206 -0.0819 -0.0805 
 (-0.90) (-5.91) (-8.80) (-2.46) (-6.73) (-8.57) 
       
Number of observations 5,234 5,164 5,164 5,226 5,156 5,156 
R-squared (%) 2.5% 9.4% 8.1% 2.2% 6.8% 5.7% 
F-statistic 14.0 43.3 64.5 13.0 28.8 43.1 
Akaike Information  
Criterion (AIC) -6910.0 -7080.0 -7060.0 -5780.0 -5870.0 -5860.0 
Bayes Information  
Criterion (BIC) -6880.00 -7020.00 -7020.00 -5750.00 -5810.00 -5820.00 
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Table 5 Panel A. Risk-taking and Corporate Governance 
We analyze the relationship between investor protection, disclosure, and rule of law proxies and the risk-taking proxies, RISK2 ( cσ ) and 
RISK3 ( cΩ ).A detailed computation of both risk-taking measures and the real GDP-per-capita growth is presented in Table 1. As 
explanatory variables we include anti-director rights (ADR), the quality of the accounting standard (ASR), and the rule of law (RL) (from La
Porta et al. (1998)). As controls we include a Herfindahl index, claims on private sector by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions as share of GDP, stock market capitalization as share of GDP (the latter two measures from Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (2001)), 
earnings smoothing proxy (refer to Table 1 for definition) and the logarithm of 1991 GDP-per-capita (in US$). We consider companies in the 
manufacturing industry only, SIC codes 2000 through 3999. 
 
  Dependent Variable:  
 RISK2 ( cσ ) RISK3 ( cΩ ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Disclosure 0.0010   0.0009 0.0010   0.0009 
 (2.44)   (2.28) (2.02)   (1.97) 
Rule of Law   0.0055  0.0040  -0.0014  -0.0024 
   (1.87)  (1.58)  (-0.35)  (-0.54) 
Anti-Director Index    0.0028 0.0021   0.0032 0.0005 
    (1.15) (0.81)   (0.92) (0.13) 
Earnings Smoothing -0.0448 -0.0676 -0.0553 -0.0487     
 (-1.58) (-3.21) (-2.53) (-1.83)     
Herfindahl Index 0.0251 0.0342 0.0052 0.0437 -0.0463 -0.0552 -0.0732 -0.0322 
 (0.7) (0.77) (0.11) (1.22) (-1.27) (-1.8) (-1.65) (-1.51) 
Private Credit -0.0007 -0.0006 0.0012 -0.0032 0.0149 0.0160 0.0179 0.0132 
 (-0.07) (-0.05) (0.1) (-0.34) (0.93) (1.2) (1.12) (0.98) 
Market Capitalization -0.0061 0.0078 -0.0005 -0.0059 0.0008 0.0100 0.0025 0.0049 
 (-0.54) (0.82) (-0.04) (-0.53) (-1.29) (-0.72) (-0.93) (-1.26) 
1991 GDP-per-capita -0.0012 -0.0087 0.0003 -0.0060 0.0047 -0.0025 0.0037 0.0000 
 (-0.49) (-1.76) (0.09) (-1.2) (0.79) (0.57) (0.76) (0.81) 
Number of observations 35 38 38 35 35 38 38 35 
R-squared (%) 38.9% 30.4% 22.8% 46.9% 41.7% 29.7% 28.9% 43.0% 
F-statistic 3.7 2.4 2.0 3.8 7.8 3.6 3.8 5.0 
Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) -182.2 -196.9 -193.0 -183.2 -148.3 -156.2 -155.7 -145.1 
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Table 5 Panel B. Economic Growth and Risk-taking 
We analyze the relationship between annual real GDP-per-capita growth and risk-taking measures: RISK2 ( cσ ) and RISK3 ( cΩ ). Real 
GDP-per-capita growth is computed using IMF International Financial Statistics database. A detailed computation of both risk-taking
measures and the real GDP-per-capita growth is presented in Table 1. As alternative risk-taking proxies we use instruments for both RISK2 
and RISK3, ( )RLASRADRE cc ,,|σσ =  and ( )ASRRLADRE cc ,,|Ω=Ω . As control variables we include anti-director rights 
(ADR), the quality of the accounting standard (ASR), and the rule of law (RL) (from La Porta et al. (1998)). Further controls include claims 
on private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as share of GDP, stock market capitalization as share of GDP (both 
measures from Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (2001)), average schooling years in the total population over 25 in 1990 (from Barro and Lee
(1993)), and the logarithm of 1991 GDP-per-capita in US dollars. We consider companies in the manufacturing industry only (SIC codes 
2000 through 3999). Regressions (2) and (3) present results using risk-taking proxy RISK2, while (4) and (5) present results using RISK3. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Average Real GDP-per-capita growth, 1992-2002 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RISK2, cσ   0.0047    
  (0.05)    
Predicted RISK2, cσ     0.4187   
    (1.69)   
RISK3, cΩ      0.0072  
     (0.08)  
Predicted RISK3, cΩ       0.4359 
      (2.18) 
Anti-Director Index 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001  
 (0.07) (0.06)  (0.07)  
Disclosure 0.0003 0.0003  0.0002  
 (1.24) (1.24)  (1.04)  
Rule of Law 0.0043 0.0043  0.0043  
 (2.32) (2.25)  (2.34)  
Private Credit 0.0008 0.0008 0.0037 0.0007 0.0031 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.47) (0.1) (0.44) 
Market Capitalization -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0082 -0.0038 -0.0073 
 (-0.72) (-0.72) (-1.05) (-0.7) (-1.07) 
Schooling, 1990 0.0001 0.0001 0 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.1) (0.09) (-0.02) (0.09) (-0.11) 
1991 GDP-per-capita ($) -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.0034 -0.0104 -0.0064 
 (-2.97) (-2.99) (-0.98) (-2.91) (-1.72) 
Number of observations 35 35 35 35 35 
R-squared (%) 32.0% 32.0% 12.1% 32.0% 20.5% 
F-statistic 2.0 1.8 0.8 2.1 1.2 
Akaike Information Criterion  -212.1 -210.1 -207.2 -210.2 -210.7 
Bayes Information Criterion  -199.7 -196.1 -197.8 -196.2 -201.4 
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Table 5 Panel C. Total Factor Productivity Growth and Risk-taking 
We analyze the relationship between annual total factor productivity growth and risk-taking measures: RISK2 ( cσ ) and RISK3 ( cΩ ). Total 
factor productivity is computed using the Penn World Tables, version 6.1. A detailed computation of both risk-taking measures and the total 
factor productivity growth is presented in Table 1. As alternative risk-taking proxies we use instruments for both risk proxies, ( )RLASRADRE cc ,,|σσ =  and ( )ASRRLADRE cc ,,|Ω=Ω . As control variables we include anti-director rights (ADR), the 
quality of the accounting standard (ASR), and the rule of law (RL) (from La Porta et al. (1998)). Further controls include claims on private 
sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as share of GDP, stock market capitalization as share of GDP (both measures
from Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (2001)), average schooling years in the total population over 25 in 1990 (from Barro and Lee (1993)), and 
the 1991 TFP growth. We consider companies in the manufacturing industry only (SIC codes 2000 through 3999). Regressions (2) and (3)
present results for RISK2, while (4) and (5) use RISK3. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Average TFP growth, 1992-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RISK2, cσ   0.0959    
  (0.80)    
Predicted RISK2, cσ    1.3332   
   (4.76)   
RISK3, cΩ     0.0433  
    (0.55)  
Predicted RISK3, cΩ      0.5082 
     (2.55) 
Anti-Director Index 0.0021 0.0018  0.0021  
 (1.94) (1.4)  (1.91)  
Disclosure 0.0007 0.0006  0.0006  
 (2.58) (2.38)  (2.5)  
Rule of Law 0.0014 0.0014  0.0014  
 (1.45) (1.56)  (1.47)  
Private Credit -0.0125 -0.0116 -0.0080 -0.0132 -0.0136 
 (-2.56) (-2.46) (-2.09) (-2.44) (-3.33) 
Market Capitalization -0.0046 -0.0038 -0.0059 -0.0041 0.0020 
 (-0.55) (-0.45) (-0.71) (-0.47) (0.32) 
Schooling, 1990 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0008 
 (-0.9) (-1) (-0.23) (-0.92) (-0.74) 
1991 TFP Growth 0.1487 0.1414 0.1275 0.1446 0.1316 
 (2.59) (2.41) (2.82) (2.47) (2.21) 
Number of observations 35 35 35 35 35 
R-squared (%) 37.3% 38.8% 30.3% 38.1% 29.5% 
F-statistic 5.2 5.1 7.3 4.3 3.4 
Akaike Information Criterion -221.1 -219.9 -221.4 -219.6 -221.0 
Bayes Information Criterion -208.6 -205.9 -212.1 -205.6 -211.7 
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Figure 1. Risk-taking and disclosure. 
Risk-taking proxies, RISK2 ( cσ ) and RISK3 ( cΩ ), and the quality of accounting standards rating (from La Porta et al. (1998)). 
The fitted line represents the slope from a quintile regression of the risk-taking proxy on constant and disclosure ranking. 
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Figure 2. Risk-taking and anti-director rights. 
Risk-taking proxies, RISK2 ( cσ ) and RISK3 ( cΩ ), and anti-director rights index (from La Porta et al. (1998)).  The fitted line 
represents the slope from a quintile regression of the risk-taking proxy on anti-director rights index. 
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Figure 3. Risk-taking and rule of law. 
Risk-taking proxies, RISK2 ( cσ ) and RISK3 ( cΩ ), and the rule of law indicator (from La Porta et al. (1998)).  The fitted line 
represents the slope from a quintile regression of the risk-taking proxy on constant and the rule of law indicator. 
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Figure 4. GDP growth and risk-taking. 
Predicted risk-taking proxies, cσ  and cΩ , and average real GDP-per-capita growth. The measures have been computed for the 
sample 1992-2002, using Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial database.  The fitted line represents the slope from a quintile
regression of real GDP-per-capita growth on constant and the risk-taking proxy. 
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Figure 5. Total factor productivity growth and risk-taking. 
Predicted risk-taking proxies, cσ  and cΩ , and country average total factor productivity growth. The measures have been computed
for the sample 1992-2000, using the Compustat Global Industrial/Commercial database.  The fitted line represents the slope from a
quintile regression of TFP growth on constant and the risk-taking proxy. 
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